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Abstract: The skeptical challenge to politics is that if knowledge is in short 
supply and it is a condition for the proper use of political power, then there is 
very little just politics. Cicero’s Republicanism is posed as a program for 
political legitimacy wherein both citizens and their states are far from ideal. 
The result is a form of what is termed negative conservatism, which shows 
political gridlock in a more positive light. 
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I. 
Consider the ideal state Socrates sketches in Plato’s Republic. It has its three 
classes, structured educational system, division of labor, and noble lies. The 
three famous challenges from Socrates’ interlocutors to this polity were to the 
equality of women, to the proscriptions on private property, and to the 
possibility of a class of people with the requisite knowledge to run the 
complicated machinery of state. The answers to the first two challenges 
depended on a successful answer to the third. That is, only if we know that it’s 
right do we overturn custom in such a radical way. Further, we can have that 
certainty only if there is a kind of knowledge sketched in the divided line – 
knowledge that transcends the mere appearances and guesswork in which we 
normally wallow. If that kind of knowledge is not achievable, communicable and 
practicable, then the ideal state is not possible. Knowledge, in short, is the source 
of legitimate authority; otherwise it’s all just coercion by people with titles. 
And Plato saw, too, that even with this knowledge and structuring, the 
state is still vulnerable from inside, as the famous precipitous progression from 
the kalliopolis to timarchy, to oligarchy, and then to tyranny looms. Knowledge 
may make the ideal state possible, but it cannot guarantee its stability.  
Now consider a clear fact about what passes for knowledge of politics. 
Many people take themselves to know many things about political culture, 
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justice, and how governments should be run. Yet very few of them agree about 
much anything. This is not because one group is better informed, more honest, or 
open-eyed about the world than another. Few, if any, genuine political 
disagreements are between those who get it and those who don’t. This is belied, 
of course, by how all too many involved in the debates themselves see the 
situation. They think and thereby portray the opposition to be mendacious, 
conniving, stupid and often downright evil.  
Were it only the case that for every significant issue, there was one and 
only one side for reasonable and honest people and all the other sides were for 
the moral monsters and intellectual failures! What a world it would be! 
Alas, we don’t live in a world of easy answers, and so we don’t live in a 
world wherein we can sort ourselves as clearly in the right, and everybody else is 
clearly in the wrong. This kind of intellectual humility, a kind of healthy 
skepticism, is bad news in one clear sense. The moral world is not as easy as 
dogmatism makes it out to be. But it’s good news in another sense – we are 
liberated to learn a bit, have conversations with others who might otherwise be 
simple enemies, and it allows us not to be so worried about the doubts we might 
carry about what we’d for so long thought were our beliefs.  
The simple fact is that we contract our beliefs more like catching colds 
than deliberating about and choosing them. Consider most people you know. 
Once you know a few things about their history, you can predict their political 
views. But notice that these determining factors for belief are not evidential 
factors for the belief’s truth. Rather, they are just about whether these folks will 
have the belief. These beliefs are overwhelmingly products of their cognitive 
environment.  
Now, even if it’s strange to think it in the first person and think the 
thought, “My views are products of their environment and are contingencies of 
my upbringing,” it is clearly easy to do with others. And it’s a truism on college 
campuses. So liberal-leftist colleges are rife with speech codes and derogatory 
labels (usually involving a ‘-phobia’) for any program critical of the progressive 
agenda. And religiously conservative campuses won’t even allow students to 
have Young Democrats clubs or have anything but qualified Christian teaching 
staff, so as to ally the worries of parents that college might make their kids 
‘weird.’ 
Now, the point is not to fight the culture wars all over again. Instead, it is 
to point to a feature of them: they derive from a deep and abiding dogmatism, 
not only about the obvious correctness of their objectives, but to the obvious 
decadence and depravity of their opposition. 
II. 
That the contemporary world is a morally fractious place is, perhaps, not news. I 
presume that it is equally not news that the ancient world was morally fractious, 
too. In many ways, this is what led Plato to write his Republic and Laws as he did 
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– both the ideal and second best cities had to start from scratch. Neither political 
work was posited on providing a program of reform or reconstruction from the 
mess we find ourselves in, but of construction de novo. Plato’s vision was a 
dogmatic one, a vision that runs that a properly run state is one that eliminates 
the fractiousness of the moral world: either completely, as we see in the 
totalitarian dream of the Republic, or by way of redirection as seen in the mixed 
state of Magnesia in the Laws. Those states are based on the thought that we can 
push RESET on history, that new starts happen. Maybe they do, maybe they 
don’t, but the overwhelming likelihood is that we will never get the chance to 
push RESET. What then? More fractiousness? Back to the blind battle of 
dogmatisms? 
I think this is why Cicero’s skeptical political philosophy is important. 
First, Cicero is no dogmatist. He is a skeptic. He has his preferences, for sure, as 
to how to conceive of law and what desiderata are required for justice. But he 
thinks a good state makes room for a variety of voices. Second, Cicero is no 
revolutionary. He does not wish for the state to have RESTART; instead he takes 
things to be well-ordered as they can be without completely knocking it all 
down. So that makes him a kind of conservative, in his case particularly, a 
Republican. This republicanism is the core of his book, De Re Publica, on the 
commonwealth, the public thing. He stands for preserving a state that promises 
social stability, provides opportunities for all to represent their views or have 
them represented, and protects individual liberties. 
And so a sketch of the intellectual core of Cicero’s skeptical republicanism 
is worth our time to reflect upon. My plan is to briefly lay out Cicero’s skeptical 
program in the Academica, specifically the method of reason-survey that yields 
intellectual freedom. I will then turn to showing how Cicero’s political 
philosophy, both in the Laws and the Republic recapitulate the skeptical 
program. Finally, I will have some things to say about contemporary politics, 
particularly the phenomenon of legislative gridlock. It will be some good news 
about it. 
III. 
Cicero’s philosophical education is best described as eclectic. He was tutored in 
Athens by the leading minds in the Academic philosophy (Philo of Larissa and 
Antiochus of Ascalon), Stoicism (Posidonius), and Epicureanism (Phaedrus and 
Zeno), but the output was decidedly skeptical.1 He remarks, when providing a 
short digest of his works in an unguarded moment in De Divinatione, that his 
Academica, his defense of Academic Skepticism is the statement of his 
considered views.  
                                                                        
1 Cicero gives accounts of his educational history in De Finibus 1.16; Tusculan Disputations 
2.61; Academica 1.14, and Lucullus 115.  
Scott Aikin 
278 
… in my Academicis Libris, in four volumes, I set forth the philosophic system 
which I thought least arrogant (arrogans) and at the same time most consistent 
and refined (constans et elegans). (De Divinitatione 2.1) 
What drew Cicero to the Academic viewpoint? Surely it was not the 
skeptical muddle the Academic program made of most every issue. The appeal of 
the dogmatic schools was that they provided a clear path, a bright line between 
right and wrong, a moral and cognitive compass. The Academics see it all as a 
conflicted and complicated mess. 
 
There are many arguments on either side of these questions. One of these views 
seems certain to your sapiens; but the weight of the arguments on either side 
strikes our sapiens as so equally balanced (rationem paria momenta) … that it is 
not even clear to him what is persuasive. (Academica 2.124) 
  
The skeptics practiced what the Greeks called dialectical method, or 
Latinized, the mode of pro et contra with all issues. 
It is a considerable matter to understand any one of the systems of philosophy 
singly, how much harder it is to master them all! Yet this is the task that 
confronts those whose principle is to discover the truth by the method of 
arguing both for and against all the schools (et contra omnis philosophos et pro 
omnibus dicere). (De Natura Deorum. 1.11) 
[O]ur school argues against everything (contra omnia … disputatur) … because 
we could not get a clear view of what is probable (probabile) unless a 
comparative estimate were made of all the arguments on both sides (ex utraque 
parte causarum). (De Officiis 2.8) 
In short, the order of thinking things through should be: hear all the arguments 
for and against, then make the decision. It won’t be perfect, since the issues are 
difficult and it is likely not all the information is in, but we make the decision 
with our eyes open to the risks, what the stakes are, what things our critics will 
say if (and often enough when) we fail. Moreover, when we make this sort of 
eyes-open decision, we are the deciders, our conscience, our best most reflective 
judgment. It is not our antecedent presumptions, not our prejudices on the 
opposition, not our preferred outcome from before we heard all the evidence. 
Rather, it is us deciding. 
[Y]et we are freer (liberores) and less constrained (solutiores) in that we 
possess our power of judgment uncompelled, and are bound by no compulsion 
to support all the dogmas laid down for us almost as edicts by certain masters. 
(Academica 2. 8) 
The contrast, of course, is with the alternative, that of showing up to 
debates with a simple agenda of arguing to defend the turf, give no ground, and 
demolish opposition. If that’s been the default for argumentative exchange for 
most of one’s intellectual life, think of how closed off one is, how a person’s early 
commitments locked her in to a lifetime of intellectual commitments. 
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For all other people in the first place are held in close bondage placed upon 
them before they were able to judge what doctrine was the best, and secondly 
they form judgments about matters as to which they know nothing at the most 
incompetent period of life, either under the guidance of some friend or under 
the influence of a single harangue from the first lecture they attended, and cling 
to it as a rock to whatever theory they are carried to by stress of weather. 
(Academica 2.8) 
The great irony is that we make so many of our intellectual allegiances 
long before we can tell the right from not, true from false, the profound from the 
stupid. Yet once we cast our lots, we find ourselves locked in: an intellectual 
program to defend, to represent, to carry on. A favored figure to promote, plumb 
and expand upon. All this before we had the data in, before we knew better. 
Again, the Academic program is posed at least as something that mollifies 
the effect of the dogmatism of unreflective assent and it consequent intellectual 
servility. 
[O]ur New Academy allows us wide liberty (magnam licentiam), so that it is 
within my right to defend any theory that presents itself to me as most 
probable (maxime probabile). (De Officiis. 3.21) 
[I]t is characteristic of the Academy to put forward no conclusions of its own, 
but to approve those which seem to approach nearest to the truth (simillima 
veri videantur); to compare arguments; to draw forth all that may be said in 
behalf of any opinion; and without asserting any authority of its own, to leave 
the judgment of the inquirer wholly free. (De Divinatione 2. 150) 
Now notice that skeptical philosophy in Cicero’s hand is no negative image 
of dogmatism, one with no commitments, a view that all programs are bankrupt. 
Such austere skepticism is not the Ciceronian program. Cicero is a mitigated 
skeptic, a skeptic that allows us, once purged of our reactionary inclinations in 
the gristmill of the pro et contra method, to follow our best judgment on the 
basis of what looks most plausible. The consequence is that the Academic 
program can yield results, but they are tentatively held. 
 
I shall humor you and explain what you wish as best I can, not however as if I 
were the Pythian Apollo making statements to be regarded as certain and 
unalterable, but following out a train of probabilities (probabilia) as one poor 
mortal out of many. For further than likelihood as I may see it (veri similia 
videam), I cannot get. (Tusculan Disputations 1.17)  
  
And thus the Academics and Cicero were fallibilists, they held their views 
in ways that allowed revision in light of new evidence and required only that one 
follow the evidence, not a party line. And so we see how the intellectual humility 





The political consequences of the Academic skeptical outlook are significant, as 
the output is what I call the Citizen Skeptic. But first, consider the biggest concern 
about the skeptical attitude when taken into the political realm, as Cicero pauses 
in De Legibus: 
And let us implore the Academy – the new one, formed by Arcelisaus and 
Carneades – to be silent, since it contributes nothing but confusion to all these 
problems; for if it should attack what we have constructed and arranged so 
beautifully, it would play too great havoc … (De Legibus 1.40). 
Skepticism arises from the tumult of views, it is primarily a manifestation 
of the spirit of criticism, and its results are the weakening of commitment. The 
worry is that the skeptics’ critical program is only negative, and purely 
destructive. The wake of the skeptic’s critical view is not only a dissolution of our 
beliefs, but a failure of political will. This concern about skepticism is an instance 
of a longstanding anti-skeptical trope, that of apraxia. A/praxia being Greek for 
no action – skepticism’s paralysis in the mind becomes paralysis in life. Now, the 
apraxia argument runs simply: 
If one is a skeptic, one has no commitments. 
One can act intentionally only if one has commitments. 
We must act intentionally. 
So, we must not be skeptics. 
What makes the political case an instance of the apraxia argument is that 
political life requires a special brand of intentional action and intellectual 
commitment, one that approaches certainty, for there are sacrifices one must 
make in political decisions. One of Cicero’s interlocutors in the Academica, 
Lucullus, invokes this thought: 
It is impossible for anyone to value impartiality and fidelity so highly that there 
is no punishment he would refuse in order to maintain them, unless he has 
given his assent to impressions that can’t be false. (Academica 2.23) 
One must, it seems, be certain that justice is better than injustice when one 
is tempted to steal, when one must make a sacrifice or when one’s very life is on 
the line. And so Cicero concedes in De Re Publica: 
[T]he establishment of a state which is stable enough to endure for the ages 
requires by far the highest intellectual powers (maximi consilii). (De Republica 
3.4.7) 
When the stakes are high, the criteria for acceptance are demanding. And 
such conditions are ripe for skeptical challenge, as when standards go up, the 
occasions for doubt increase. And now let us return to the dismissal of the 
skeptics in De Legibus. Cicero hadn’t finished his thought.  
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And let us implore the Academy – the new one, formed by Arcelisaus and 
Carneades – to be silent, since it contributes nothing but confusion to all these 
problems; for if it should attack what we have constructed and arranged so 
beautifully, it would play too great havoc; at the same time I should like to win 
over this school, and so do not dare banish it from the discussion. (De Legibus 
1.40) 
The Ciceronian program, then, isn’t that the skeptic must be silent because 
critique will destroy what’s been established, but that without the skeptic’s 
challenge, without the withering gaze of Academic criticism, what stands will not 
continue and will not have the right to.  
The reason why the highest intellectual powers are necessary for the 
confirmation of a just republic is that the ways the state may coerce, alienate, or 
staunch the autonomy of the citizens must be anticipated, and if not anticipated, 
then it must be recognized before rebellion and revolution foment. Cicero pauses 
in De Legibus to identify a core republican view, that all citizens need to feel the 
state is something they not only are protected by, but have a stake in. A good 
state is a re publica – a public thing, something that belongs to all. This is why the 
tribunate of the plebeians, despite the way it stands in the way of the Senate’s 
role with its veto power, despite the way tribunes are mostly rabble rousers and 
blowhards, despite the fact that the institution of tribune is all too often abused 
in profligacy with budgets, it is necessary for the state of a true republic (De 
Legibus 3.18). It is in the tribune’s appeal to the rabble that the tribunate makes 
the rabble care for the state. They care, and they care enough to hope that the 
state will be just; and so that it will survive.  
The skeptical view that we do not have knowledge with these matters 
returns – we are all in this together, and so even the rabble’s view matters. If the 
skeptic is right, none of us know. And so the views of the masses may be right for 
all we know.2 Their being part of the conversation, part of the method of pro et 
contra is a condition for not only feeling part of the state, but for having any 
political authority.  
But this is only a method of management. We do not have perfect 
knowledge. There is a limit of what we can do to anticipate and ameliorate. The 
tribunate functions as a good feedback mechanism for those purposes. But even 
with this institution, we cannot anticipate and ameliorate well enough for all 
circumstances. Disaster awaits all states. 
[T]he essential nature of the commonwealth (rerum publicarum) often defeats 
reason. (De Republica 2.33.57) 
Recall that even Plato’s Kalliopolis, one that starts from scratch, has the 
citizens raised under perfect conditions, and has perfectly wise leaders, has its 
own internal failure – it is vulnerable from the inside, it has its own trajectory of 
                                                                        
2 See Fott 2014, 250 for an account of the skeptical interface with the tradition of Natural Law 
in Cicero’s politics.  
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irrationality. Cicero’s republic is not an ideal state, but the best the world’s 
provided. And that means that we must run a government with the citizenry 
we’ve got. Some are virtuous and intelligent, but let’s face it: most of our fellow 
citizens, most of us, are selfish, reactionary, badly educated and deeply irrational. 
For sure, some states are destroyed by large-scale invasions, pandemics, or 
famines. But that limit of political rationality is a limit provided by the world – 
we are not omniscient, we cannot anticipate and avert every earthquake or flood. 
But this limit is one of our failure to anticipate what we will do, how we will feel, 
and how we will get along. We are the agents of chaos; we are the limits of 
political reason. 
Cicero proposes what he calls “the ideal statesman” as a model for what 
kind of character is required for consistently taking up with the requirements of 
state and setting an example for all involved. It is a republican parallel to the 
familiar philosopher-king. This ideal statesman must be: 
… improving and examining himself continually, urging others to imitate him, 
and furnishing in himself, as it were, a mirror to his fellow citizens by reason of 
the supreme excellence of his life and character. (De Republica 2.42.69) 
We might put it that the Ciceronian statesman is not only to be well-
informed but to be exemplary about it. Knowledge, again, is the source of 
legitimate authority, so we need people who pursue it and encourage others to 
do so, too. 
But this returns us to the skeptical challenge. If the skeptic is right, there 
isn’t any knowledge. If the skeptic is right, there are not only no ideal states, 
there are no ideal statesmen. If the skeptic is right, our highest intellectual 
powers aren’t too high and are hardly powers at all. The citizen skeptic, then, 
knows this is all a mug’s game, a fool’s errand. In the end, this politics stuff is 
inherently tragic. 
Cicero himself was exactly such a tragic figure.3 He detects and stops the 
Catilinarian conspiracy, but he is hasty in the aftermath and orders the 
executions of the conspirators. This breaks a rule of procedure, and after his 
consulship, it yields banishment by the tribune Clodius Pulcher. Later, in the 
aftermath of Julius Caesar’s assassination, Cicero becomes one of the few people 
who could run the Senate. He sees the chance to eliminate the remaining 
Caesarians under Mark Antony and he takes it. But Antony survives, makes 
amends with Octavian, and Cicero, himself, is executed.  
Ideal statesman or no, the nature of politics, the play of force and justice, 
ambition and service, power and authority, defeated a voice of reason. 
 
                                                                        
3 See Anthony Everett’s portrait of Cicero’s life in (2003) and Jonathan Zarecki’s (2014) case 
that Cicero’s picture of the ideal statesman arose from his own aspirations and failings in the 
aftermath of the Civil War. 
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V. 
Let us return once more to the pause in De Legibus as Cicero considers barring 
the skeptics. 
... let us implore the Academy ... to be silent .. for if it should attack what we 
have constructed so beautifully, it would play too great havoc … (De Legibus 
1.40) 
Two background assumptions are operative here. The first is that what we 
have already is well-constructed, the second is that sticking with the stable is 
better than moving to the unstable. Despite the fact that Cicero was a skeptic, he 
nevertheless was a kind of conservative. My view is that Cicero’s conservatism is 
a result of his skepticism. To see this point, let’s make a distinction between 
positive and negative conservatism. 
Positive conservatism is the view that our reason for preferring standing 
institutions and norms come from indicators that these institutions are truly just, 
are the best way to do things, are most reflective of truths of human nature. And 
there is a wide variety of sources for these sorts of reasons: perhaps those 
reasons derive from revealed truths in a holy book, these reasons could be 
derived from timeless truths, or a more modest kind of reason may simply be 
that longstanding practices wouldn’t be so longstanding if they didn’t have track 
records of success. So the positive conservative holds that we have positive 
reason to hold to standing institutions and norms. 
Negative conservatism is the view that we have no positive reasons to 
hold to our current institutions and practices, but we have no positive reason in 
favor of any of the competitors either. All the views are on a kind of valuational 
flatland – they all have pros, they all have cons, every option is a mixed bag. The 
reason why we should prefer current institutions, however, is that, given what 
we know about humans, instability creates more problems. And so if every 
option has pros and cons, then considerations of changing from option A to 
option B adds to the cons of B (that we will create uncertainty, need to refigure 
things, and so on) and adds to the pros of A (that we don’t get those headaches). 
And so negative conservatism is run off a principle of minimal mutilation – that 
reasons for change must outweigh not only reasons in favor of alternatives, but 
must outweigh the reasons against disturbing the peace. 
Clearly no skeptic would ever be a positive conservative, but the 
possibility of negative conservatism is open. The question is, however, how a 
skeptic would assent to the minimal mutilation principle. 
Notice that the minimal mutilation principle is not a principle of belief, but 
of action. It is not about what is true, but it is about what to do when you don’t 
know what’s true. Many of those who have sipped or drunk deeply from 
Skepticism’s font light on something akin to the minimal mutilation principle. In 
the parallel ancient skeptical tradition, that of Pyrrhonism, Sextus Empiricus 
holds that one should live according to the skeptical fourfold: 
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For we follow a line of reasoning which, in accordance with appearances, points 
us to a life comfortable to the customs of our country and its laws and 
institutions and to our own instinctive feelings. (PH I.17) 
And Rene Descartes, the famous methodological skeptic, proposes a 
provisional morality, the first maxim of which is: 
… to obey the laws and customs of my country, constantly retaining the religion 
… I had been brought up in since childhood, and in all matters follow the most 
moderate and least excessive opinions. (Discourse on Method III CSM 1.122; AT 
VI.23) 
The reason in the background is that if the circumstances are such that 
you can actually do philosophy, so that you can do the kind of skeptical critique 
wherein we can even frame this kind of question, then we have something that 
counts in favor of the circumstances. We want to keep that circumstance, those 
cultural and political conditions, in place. To do otherwise risks error, risks 
overturning what makes it possible for us to correct our errors. 
This is why tyranny is so bad. Tyrants have a bad track record for how 
they treat people, but they have an even worse track record of hearing about and 
correcting those errors. The same goes for oligarchs and plutocrats – they not 
only make errors, but because of how they are situated, they don’t recognize the 
errors as errors. And this is why philosophy is very hard to do under tyrannical 
conditions, under oligarchic conditions – honest criticism, the play of pro et 
contra is not valued. 
This is why Cicero is a republican conservative. It is under the conditions 
of recognizing and protecting individual rights, including a wide variety of 
voices, and weighing policy on the basis of shared reasons that philosophy can 
flourish. For this arrangement is fragile and ultimately doomed – the nature of 
the republic defeats reason. A tyrant will rise, the rich will take control from all, 
the poor will abolish high culture, or a military junta will take over.  
VI. 
So what lesson is there to take from this trajectory from the citizen skeptic to the 
tragic republican? I think one lesson is that we can see a current phenomenon of 
political culture we regularly find objectionable in a new light. 
Consider all the complaint we have of gridlock in legislatures. Bills can’t be 
passed, major legislation is held up, budgets take forever to be endorsed. 
Governance happens very slowly.  
This regrettable phenomenon is explained by two things: the rules of 
legislatures and the polarization of the legislators (and, presumably, the voting 
populace). Gridlock is regrettable, but given the fact of the wide and sometimes 
unbridgeable differences of opinion on major matters, slow-moving government 
is preferable, is it not? Muting the polarized sides with rules of procedure, 
vetoes, opposing forces within the various offices. The design is for the 
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government not to be a fast-moving thing. Why? Because without the 
institutional rules, the counter-balances of offices, one of the factions may pass 
their agenda unopposed and undo what had come before. And with another 
swing of voter sentiment, another press of governmental RESTART. 
Legislative gridlock is good news in a polarized society. It means that the 
rules of government have made it so that the cultural extremes do not take 
control for short bursts of production for their own program and destruction for 
the opposition’s. And so minimal mutilation. We retain what makes it so that we 
can at least see each other’s views as worth debating, but don’t do anything rash. 
The bad news, of course, is that little gets done – often, not even the 
moderate compromises. But we must remind ourselves not only what goods 
gridlock stands in the way of, but what bads it prevents. And so the citizen 
skeptic, the Ciceronian tragic republican, not only endorses the state of current 
gridlock, but holds that it may be the best we should hope for. 
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